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Public Landlords and Private Tenants: The
Eviction of "Undesirables" From Public
Housing Projects
The congressionally announced policy underlying the public hous-
ing program is to provide "decent, safe and sanitary dwellings for
families of low income."1 Beyond this goal of physically adequate
shelter, it is suggested that public housing should contribute to a
sense of community and stability often missing in urban low-income
neighborhoods. Reality, however, has wandered far from these ideals.
While housing projects represent, for those families who get in, a
physical improvement over the tenements replaced, the cost of walls
with fewer rats and stairways that do not collapse has frequently been
unwelcome, unnecessary intrusions into the personal lives of tenants.2
Public housing authorities tend to treat residents not as the reason
for their existence, but as a threat to the peace and quiet of their high-
rise towers.
3
The authorities, though the villains of this piece, deserve sympathy
as much as condemnation for their role. The problems facing them
provoke a free-handed manner of regimenting and, when necessary,
ousting tenants. Unlike most other welfare agencies, housing authori-
ties are burdened with the operation of a large business enterprise.
1. The quoted words are excerpted from the long title of the United States Housing
Act of 1937, ch. 896, 50 Stat. 888.
2. Professor Reich mentions some particularly glaring examples of an officious welfare
officialdom. Welfare agencies have attempted to control the sexual morality, personal
hygiene and living habits, and family size, among other aspects of recipients' lives. Reich,
Individual Rights and Social Welfare: The Emerging Legal Issues, 74 YA L.J, 1245 (1965),
Reich, Searching Homes of Public Assistance Recipients, 37 Soc. Slv. RV . 328 (1964). Seealso Reich, The New Property, 73 YAI.E L.J. 733, 758-62 (1964).
3. The poor record of some public housing authorities in dealing with their tenants
has finally attracted the official attention of HUD. In a circular dated February 7, 1967,
on the subject of "Termination of Tenancy in Low-Rent Projects," [hereinafter cited as
Circular 2-7-67], the Assistant Secretary for Renewal and Housing Assistance informed
local authorities that "within the past year increasing dissatisfaction has been expressed
with eviction practices in public low-rent housing projects." The Circular went on to
require that the authorities adopt somewhat fairer procedures. See p. 993 infra.
For varying degrees of criticism of public housing project management, see H. Salisbury,
The Shook-Up Generation, in URBAN RENEWAL: PEOPLE, POLITICS, AND PLANNING 431-33
(J. Bellush & M. Hausknecht eds. 1967); A. ScnO-aa, SLuMxS AND SOCIAL INSECURITY 110-19
(1963); Bauer, The Dreary Deadlock of Public Housing, ARCHIrrECTURAL FORUI, May 1957,
at 140; Dunham & Grundstein, Impact of a Confusion of Social Objectives on Public
Housing: A Preliminary Analysis, 12 MARRIAGE S. FAA. LIviNG 103 (1955); Friedman,
Public Housing and the Poor: An Overview, 54 CALF. L. RFv. 642 (1966); Glazer, Housing
Problems and Housing Policies, PUB. INTEREST, Spring 1967, at 21; Harrington, Slums Old
and New, 30 COMmENTARY 118 (1960); Mulvihill, Problems in the Management of Public
Housing, 35 TEmp. L.Q. 163 (1962).
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Not unnaturally, project managers may come to think of their duties
in terms of the project's physical plant, employees, and finances. Fed-
erally-assisted housing authorities, which must justify unbudgeted
deficits to the Housing Assistance Administration,4 have added reason
to dislike tenants who waste heat and water, damage premises or be-
come delinquent in their rent. The continuous and energetic political
assault on public housing has also played its part. Anxious for the pro-
gram's future, housing authority officials have imposed numerous re-
strictions upon tenants to avoid the least appearance of harboring
rowdies, derelicts, prostitutes, or subversives.r
Inside the project, the manager has a difficult time with many of his
tenants. As public housing has been increasingly opened to the lowest
income groups within society-the permanently poor-its population
of so-called problem families has grown.0 These families-large, with-
out regular income, often fatherless, ignorant of the fundamentals of
sanitation and housekeeping-are costly to the project and tarnish its
image in the community.7 They drive or frighten away more prosper-
ous tenants, depriving public housing of stabler occupants, Unable to
pay much rent in the first place, problem families are the most fre-
quent rent defaulters.
Caught between this crossfire, public housing authorities sometimes
lay too hasty and heavy a hand on project residents.0 Unreasonable or
unnecessary restrictions are imposed; sensible regulations are applied
in wooden, senseless fashion. A Chicago project evicted tenants for
organizing "quarter parties" where food and drinks were sold on the
4. Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Housing and Urban Develop-
ment, Low-Rent Management Manual § 2 (lay 1966).
5. See Dunham 9- Grundstein, supra note 3, at 106-09. See also Bauer, supra note 3, at
141-42. It was not always so. In public housing's infancy, when it was populated by the
Depression's submerged middle class, project management was an informal and friendly
thing. Rent collections were made by "rent girls"--oung social workers and students who
used the occasion to visit with the tenants, learn their problems, offer help and advice.
The war soon came, however, and public housing was employed to house defense workers
and, later, returning veterans. When housing projects were rededicated to the low-income
groups in 1949, the program had changed. Projects were larger, more impersonal; so was
management. The war had bureaucratized it. Tenants were now members of the truly
poor, and class difference-sometimes racial differences, too-hindered understanding be-
tween them and the project staff. The rent girls had disappeared along with the other
personal touches, with the s)mpathy of project managers for tenant's political organiza-
tions and similar expressions of community spirit, and, most sad perhaps, with the en-
thusiasm both tenants and management had once shared for public housing. Salisbury,
supra note 3, at 431; A. ScroRR, supra note 3, at 110; Friedman, supra note 3, at 650.53.
6. A. ScuoRt, supra note 3, at 112.
7. Friedman, supra note 3, at 653.
8. Mulvihill, supra note 3, at 179.
9. Dunham & Grundstein, supra note 3, at 109. Usually, public housing tenant leases
impose two to five times the number of restrictions found in ordinary leases; they are also
enforced more strictly. See also A. ScHoRR, supra note 3, at 112.
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premises at nominal prices.'0 In New Orleans a housing authority per-
mitted a blind tenant to keep his seeing-eye dog only after a protracted
wrangle.11 Many authorities do not allow tenants to conduct any type
of business in their units, though encouragement of entrepreneurial
activities among the poor is supposedly part of the anti-poverty plan.12
Residents often cannot host overnight guests,18 a galling reminder to
them not to make themselves too much at home in public housing.14
Many tenants whose leases are terminated have not violated a par-
ticular rule, but by their conduct have made themselves "undesirable"
occupants. This all-purpose rubric lends itself easily to abuse. A
project manager in New York City evicted the families of teenage
gang members as a matter of course.15 With similar Draconian logic, a
housing authority terminated the lease of a woman because her adult
son was an addict, though he did not live with his mother and ap-
parently made no trouble when he visited her.'0 Having an illegiti-
mate child commonly marks the tenant as an undesirable.17 Housing
authorities have also drawn the bounds of desirability to exclude po-
litical activists. A resident of a North Carolina project received a no-
tice to vacate within twenty-four hours after she was elected president
of a tenant union organization.' 8
Over-eager efforts to reform tenants, head off trouble, and keep the
project quiet and peaceful injure not only the tenants who are ex-
pelled for no good reason, but also the tenants who remain and, con-
sequ ntly, the entire public housing program. The injury to the
evicted tenant and his family is plain enough. Suddenly ejected from
one home with little or no time to find another, they suffer materially
and emotionally. Loss of sanctuary and familiar surroundings, coupled
with a feeling of helplessness against the dispossessor, make an eviction
10. Friedman, supra note 3, at 665.
11. Id.
12. Glazer, supra note 3, at 36.
13. Id.
14. See generally Hollingshead & Rogler, Attitudes Toward Slums and Public Housing
in Puerto Rico, in THE URBAN CONDITiON 229, 240 (L. Duhl ed. 1963).
15. Salisbury, supra note 3, at 433.
16. Sanders v. Cruise, 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958).
17. For a lengthy, critical discussion of the anti-bastardy regulations in public housing
projects, see Rosen, Tenants' Rights in Public Housing, in HOUSIN FoR rt'n PooR: Rilors
& R FmEDmS 154, 227-42 (N.Y.U. School of Law Project on Social Welfare, Supp. No. 1
1967). This article also cQntains an excellent, though somewhat overdetailed catalogue of
horribles drawn from cases involving termination of project residents' leases.
18. Housing Authority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 SXE-2d 290 (1966), vacated and -re-
manded, 386 U.S. 670 (1967) (per curiam). The authority contended that the election was
not the reason for the termination, though it gave no other. See also Cummings y. Weln.
feld, 177 Misc. 129, 30 N.Y.S.2d 36 (Sup. Ct, 1940), where a tenant of a quasi-public limited-
dividend housing development was evicted when he attempted to organize a tenants' union.
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-- especially an unjust one-a painfuli sometimes traumatic experi-
ence.19 In relocating, the ousted tenant usually finds that he must pay
more rent for less housing-frequently for substandard housing.23
The role of public housing and other urban renewal projects in reduc-
ing the supply of low-income shelter and thus forcing rents up adds a
rueful touch of irony to the family's plight.2'. Finally, terminating a
lease on grounds of undesirability marks the tenant a troublemaker
and may effectively bar his admission to other public housing.
Because serious injury attends eviction from public housing, the
threat of termination is a dangerous weapon. Used carelessly, it can
create a hostile, bitter atmosphere in a housing project.22 Tenants,
made to feel insecure, begin to distrust each other as well as project
officials.2 3 Any sense of community within the project atrophies;
families keep to their units or form small antagonistic cliques.2' De-
velopment of community life suffers further from housing authorities'
thinly-masked opposition to tenant organizations and those who at-
tempt to form them.
2 5
Many tenants deeply resent the reality they discover behind the
pleasant facade of public housing: they feel that it has been necessay
to surrender their independence and integrity in order to obtain a de-
19. Studies of low-income families displaced by urban renew-al suggest that the emo-
tional injury can be grave. One sociologist found that a forced change of residence catusd
long periods of depression in at least forty per cent of the families forced out of Baton's
West End. Fried, Grieving for a Lost Home: Psychological Costs of Relocation, in URuA.s
RE EW AL: TIE REcoim & TnE CoNTRovERsY 359 (J. Wilson ed. 1966). Since the lover
economic classes seem to have a greater need for external stability and geographic identity
in their lives, the shock of displacement is more severe to most of them than it would be
to middle class families. Id. 365-66.
20. A survey of urban renewal relocation in forty-one cities revealed that eighty per
cent of displacees paid higher rents in their new homes, though one- to two-thirds of them
ended up in sub-standard dwellings. A. ScuomR, supra note 3, at 63. In 26 cities wlich
provided little or no assistance in relocation, seventy per cent of the displaced families
moved into sub-standard housing, while in the 15 cities where such assistance was offered.
only half that proportion did not find adequate new shelter. Id. 65. The US. Housing S
Home Finance Agency, now assimilated into HUD, responded to critical studies with one
of its own, showing that almost all displacees relocated in respectable housing and at only
a small increase in rent US. Housing & Home Finance Agency, The Housing of Relocated
Families: Summary of a Census Bureau Survey, in URANs RENrWAL: Tim RrcoRn AND TilE
CoNTRovERsY 341-45 (". Wilson ed. 1966). One student of the pathology of urban renewal,
however, saw obvious statistical juggling in the HHFA report. Hartman, A Comment on
the HHFA Study of Relocation, in URBAN RENEWAL: Tnm RncoR. AND THE Co.,ronns"
353-58 (J. Wilson ed. 1966).
21. 42 U.S.C. § 1410(a) (Supp. 1967) provides that federally assisted local housing
authorities must agree to eliminate--either by demolition or improvement--one sub-
standard unit of housing for every public housing unit constructed after March 1, 1949.
22. See, supra note 3, Bauer at 246-47, Glazer at 35, Dunham & Grundstein at 110-11.
23. See Dunham & Grundstein, supra note 3, at 108; Hollingshead & Rogler, sufpra note
14, at 241.
24. See, e.g., Harrington, supra note 3, at 122-23.
25. Said one observer-critic of public housing in New York City: "Their [the project
residents] community structure has been tUrned into social mush by stupidity and
bureaucracy." Salisbury, supra note 3, at 432. See also cases cited note 18 supra.
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cent place to live.26 The type of tenant desperately needed in public
housing-the more prosperous, stable, and ambitious-will not accept
the regimentation that evokes discontent in present residents.27 Re-
strictive management policy thus exacerbates the problem-family
problem rather than solving it. In short, public housing authorities
have thrown the baby out and kept the bathwater.
Particularly because the nature of the problems faced by public
housing authorities encourages project managers to oust "undesirable"
tenants whenever this will serve convenience and tranquillity, the
need for some effective review of and check upon such evictions is
strong.2s However, neither housing authorities nor courts have af-
forded public housing residents a meaningful review of lease termina-
26. In San Juan, researchers discovered that inhabitants of the worst slums under the
American flag were generally more satisfied with their shanties than their former neighbors
were with modem, well-equipped public housing units. Hollingshead & Rogler, supra
note 14, at 258-39. In fact, less than a third of project residents-compared with two-thirds
of the slum-dwellers-liked their shelter. Similar discontent is manifest in mainland
projects. See, e.g., A. SCHORR, supra note 3, at 112. One intensive comparison of the attl-
tudes of public housing residents with those of slum families draws the opposite, and
happier, conclusion. See generally D. WILNER, HOUSING ENVIRONMENT 
AND 1 AMIL LIn
(1962). Part of the study sought to measure differences between the two groups in intra.
family activity, friendly contacts with neighbors, participation in neighborhood activities,
and feelings of security and optimism. Although the results tend to confirm the author's
hypothesis that the move into public housing strengthens family and community ties and
improves personal outlooks on life, id. 248, they are equivocal and subject to doubt on
several grounds. First, the authors neglect to describe the management of the project and
the study does not attempt to fathom tenant feeling toward the housing authority or Its
staff. Secondly, thirty-five families who moved out of the project during the study were"set aside," thus biasing the results toward more satisfied tenants. Id. 50. Thirdly, only
wives and female heads of household were interviewed, and arguably women would be
more grateful for the physical facilities of the unit and less resentful toward a sometimes
autocratic management. Finally, even if the findings are taken as accurate, they show un-
equivocal improvement in the social lives of project residents at only one point: additional
daytime contact with neighbors. Id. 164. The question left unanswered by the author is
why public housing has achieved no more success in generating the social benefits that his
hypotheses suggest should flow from the program.
27. Few of those eligible for public housing actually apply, and those that do are gen-
erally "problem" families. See, supra note 3, Bauer at 246 and Glazer at 36. A 1957 study,
conducted by the Public Housing Administration (predecessor to HUD's Housing As-
sistance Administration) discovered that eighty-five per cent of the residents who moved
out of public housing voluntarily did so because they were dissatisfied. PUDLIC IloosINto
ADMINISTRATION, HoUSING & HOME FINANCE AGENCY, MOBILITY AND MOTIVATIONS 26 (1958).
In some projects, more than ten per cent of those leaving by choice named project man-
agement as the primary cause of dissatisfaction. Id. Charges leveled against management
by these tenants included disrespect for residents' privacy, imposition of unnecessary and
bothersome rules, arbitrary and overly-severe enforcement, and plain discourtesy. Id. 66-58.
The authors of the study concluded from this data that public housing managers required
"ability and training of an unusual order"-though, as they explained it, the special
skill was only that of treating tenants fairly and reasonably. Id. 59.
28. On one occasion, administrative review of denials of admission to New York City
public housing projects for reasons of undesirability resulted in reversals in over one-third
of the cases. A. Scuoa, supra note 3, at 114. In 1957, the Public Housing Adminsltitlot
estimated moveouts from public housing at 115,000-of which 18,000, or sixteen per cent,
were removed as undesirable tenants. PHA, MOBILITY AND MOTIVATION, supra note 27, at
6, 15. If one-third of these removals were unnecessary, then 6,000 families (or well over
25,000 persons) lost their homes unjustly.
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tions. The refusal to review has not been defended as an administra-
tive necessity; instead, the authorities have justified non-review with
specious analogies whose shallow logic courts have accepted with only
an occasional dissent.
The procedures ordinarily followed by public housing authorities
seem designed to leave the tenant little opportunity to argue that
termination of his lease is unjust or unreasonable. Public housing oc-
cupants hold leases only from month to month,20- and under state laws
either party may terminate such tenancies simply by giving advance
notice to the other.30 Typically, the housing project manager notifies
the tenant that he must leave by the month's end; if the tenant re-
mains, he is evicted by summary process. Few housing authorities pro-
vide a stage where the tenant's side of the matter is heard and the
termination reconsidered.
Where administrative review exists, it has usually proven defective.
The New York City Housing Authority has for several years had a
board to which tenants could appeal a notice to leave.31 However, the
board often fails to give the tenant an adequately detailed description
of his supposed transgressions in advance of the hearing, and he can-
not plan an effective defense. At the hearing, the tenant has no op-
portunity to confront his accusers or to learn the sources of the board's
information. While the tenant can bring counsel with him, no advisor
is provided for him.
32
Recognizing the need for some semblance of fairness in terminations,
the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) recently
instructed managers of federally assisted housing projects to inform
tenants why their leases were being terminated and to hear any reply
or explanation the tenants wished to make.- While signaling an en-
couraging shift in HUD's attitude toward evictions,34 the instructions
29. HUD recommends, but does not require, that local authorities adopt the month-to-
month lease to facilitate necessary evictions. Housimo ASSISTANCE ADa.UNISTrATIox, DmAIr-
IIENr OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOP.mET, LocAL HousiNG Aurnor" IANACrE-,T
HANDBOox, Pt. IV, § 1, 1 6d, at 8 (1966). The advice seems to have been appreciated and
followed everywhere. See Friedman, supra note 3, at 660.
g0. 1 AErInCAN LAw OF PROPERTY § 3.90 (A. Casner ed. 1952); 1 H. TxrAY, REL
PROPERTY §§ 172-73 (1939).
31. New York City Housing Authority Res. 62-9-683.
32. For a fuller description and critique of the New York City review procedure, sec
Rosen, supra note 17, at 217-23.
33. Circular 2-7-67, supra note 3.
34. In 1954, after one court had permitted a tenant to challenge the constitutionality of
a regulation whose violation the authority had alleged as grounds for the termination, the
Public Housing Authority advised local authorities to plead simply termination by notice
and to remove any provisions from lease forms which might suggest something other than
a month-to-month tenancy. PHA Circular 7-28-54 (1954).
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on theit face require only a closet conference between the project
manager and the tenaht. This informal procedure falls far short of an
actual review€: thd tenant is not assured an opportunity to cross-ex-
amine the manager and his staff, advance notice of the conduct charged
againt him, or tight to counsel.85 Moreover, the manager as "prose.
cutor" is a questionable choice for impartial arbitrator.
Public housing tenants who hoped to obtain judicial review of a
termination by refusing to leave, thereby forcing the authority to seek
a court order, have been consistently disappointed. Rather than re
viewing the authofity's grounds for the termination or remanding the
matter for an impartial administrative hearing, courts have usually
treated the housing authority as an ordinary landlord, who can have
a tenant evicted merely by showing that he is holding over after the
lease has been terminatedas Analogizing public housing authorities
to private landlords is an appealingly neat solution: the court has only
to read the lease and rubberstamp the authority's decision. Few opin,
ions have bothered to probe the rationale further. Most courts un-
critically conclude that since the public housing tenant signed a "leame"
and paid "rent," the authority is for him a "landlord," nothing more.81
Whete courts have wished to bolster their opinions, they have cited
ambiguous statutory provisions which purportedly show a legislative
35. How little HUD has actually done becomes plain when Circular 2-7-67, stipra lote
3, is contrasted with steps taken to rid public housing of racial discrimination. As a cure
for the latter evil, a complete set of review procedures was instituted within federal ad-
ministrative agencies to handle complafirts of discrimination by local, federally assisted
housing projects. Where necessary, complaints were investigated and a hearing held.
24 C.F.R, §§ 1.1-.12, 1500.7 (1967). By comparison, compliance with the new termnination
procedures is enforced only through periodic audits of local authority records and oc-
casional visits to the authorities by HUD regional officials. Letter from Vrank L. Willing.
hani, Ading Hottse Cotinsel, Housing Assistance Administration, Department of Hoosing
and Urban Development, January 8, 1968, on file in the Yale Law Journal office.
36. See, e.g., Chicago Housing Authority v. Ivory, 841 Ill. App. 282, 93 N.EI'd 386
(1950) (abstract) (authority need show only that due notice to terminate was given tenant
in order to recover possession); New York City Housing Authority v. Russ, 134 N.Y.S.2d
812 (1954) (authority need only allege expiration of term of lease and unlawful holding
over in action for summary process), Housing Atuthority v. Thorpe, 267 N.C. 431, 148 S.E,2d
200 (1966) (er "uriam) (authority's reasons for terminating lease Immaterial; lease was
terminated in accordance with its express provisions for notice and after date of termlna-
ton tenant was wrongfully holding over).
37. Most opinions suggest ho other basis for their conclusions, involving as they do a
straightforward application of ordinary landlord-tenant law. E.g., cases cited note 36 supra.
Even the dissent in New York City Housing Authority v. Russ, 134 N.Y.S.2d 812, 814 (1954)
assumes that the authority is to be treated like any other landlord. Id. at 816.
In one case, the presumed identity between housing authorites arid landlords worked
to an authority's disadvantage. The court held that it was not immune from a tort action
where the project manager had entered a tenant's unit, removed his personal effects, and
locked him out. Since the authority's functions were, to the court's mind, merely proprietal
and hot governmental, the authority was stripped of its sovereign dignity and made to
stand as naked Ms any private landlord faced with a wrongful eviction complaint. Mu es V.
Housing Authority, 83 Cal. App. 2d 489, 189 P.2d 905 (1948).
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intent to grant housing authorities the prerogatives of private lessors.
Usually, however, the quoted provisions are merely broad enabling
clauses, creating the authorities and empowering them to operate hous-
ing projects. 38 Nowhere has Congress or a state legislature expressly
provided that landlord-tenant law govern evictions from public hous-
ing projects.
Several courts have thought that three provisions contained in fed-
eral housing legislation of the late 'forties evidenced a congressional
intent that local authorities be treated like ordinary landlords, where
state laws permitted,39 The provisions, two of which are no longer
operative, read to the effect that any federally assisted housing authority
shall continue to have the right to maintain an action or pro-
ceeding to recover possession of any housing accommodations
operated by it where [the] action or proceeding [was] authorized
by the statute or regulation under which such accommodations
[were] administered .... 40
But nothing in this language suggests that Congress empowered local
authorities to terminate leases without good cause or a hearing. At
most, these provisions only left state statutes granting such powers un-
impaired.
Moreover, a brief glance at the statutory complex containing the
three sections destroys the plausibility of interpreting them to grant
housing authorities untrammeled discretion, or even to ratify such t
grant by a state legislature. All three were part of the nationwide sys-
tem of rent controls imposed by Congress in 1947. I Under the controls,
no landlord could obtain an eviction order, except upon a few nar-
rowly specified grounds, notwithstanding that the tenant's lease had
expired.4 If this limitation had applied to public housing projects,
38. E.g., Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949). The court thought
that ARaZ, CODE AN. § 16-1604 (1939), which authorized municipalities to acquire and
lease housing projects, coyered the question of intent nicely, after being stretched by
reading into it a host of implied powers. Id. at 30-31, 208 P.2d at 311.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1954); 42 US.C. § 1413a (1964); and Act of June 80, 1947, ch.
163, tit. II, § 209(b), 61 Stat. 200-01, See Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69l Ariy. 26, 29, 203
P.2d 309, 310 (1949) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1413a and Section 209(b) of the Housing and Rent
Act of 1947); Columbus Met. Housing Authority v. Simpson, 85 Ohio App, 73, 7, 85 N.E.2d
560, 561 (1949) (citing Section 209(b) of the Housing and Rent Act); Municipal Housing
Authority v. Walck, 277 A.D. 791, 97 N.YS.2d 488 (1950) (citing 42 US.C,§ 140-1a, Section
209(b) of the Housing and Rent Act, and N.Y. PwIuc HousINo LAws § 37.1 (Mdcinney
1955)).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1964). In ore case, the terms in the lease were held to be a "regu.-
lation under which such accommodations were administered" and which. authorlzed the
authority to maintain the eviction action. Columbus Mt, Housing Authority v. Sinp$on,
85 Ohio App. 73, 75, 85 N.E.2d 560. 561 (1949).
41. Act of June 30, 1947, ch. 163, 61 Stat, 193.
42. Act of June 30, 1947, ch. 163, tit. I1, § 209(a), 61 Stat. 200-01.
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local authorities could not have removed occupants whose incomes
were too high to meet eligibility requirements. There is no reason to
suppose that Congress intended anything more than preservation of
the power to evict excess-income tenants when it exempted public
housing authorities from the controls. Two of the provisions, which
prohibit authorities from considering certain veterans' benefits in de-
termining a tenant's income,43 plainly indicate a congressional concern
with the maintenance of income eligibility standards. The third pro-
vision permitted eviction only after the housing authority had found
that the tenant would suffer no hardship44-solicitude plainly meant
for tenants whose only offense was prosperity.
45
Rather than offering strained misreadings of legislative intent, courts
should consider whether the landlord analogy is really appropriate. In
their position vis-ht-vis tenants, the private and the public landlord
differ in a crucial respect. The private landlord looks to his leased
property for income. He wants the greatest possible profit; conse-
quently, he will set rents as high and keep costs as low as the rental
market and tenement laws permit. Conversely, the tenant seeks the
lowest rent he can get and would have the landlord spend lavishly on
upkeep. Leases represent a compromise of these opposing interests. A
short-term lease, in this context, has the advantage of freeing either
landlord or tenant to withdraw from or renegotiate the relationship
whenever the market for housing changes.
46
Public housing authorities do not hold housing projects for profit
and so have no need for such broad freedom to terminate their rela-
tionship with project residents. The authorities' only legitimate in-
terest in their property is in its usefulness as a tool of national and
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1404a (1964); Housing and Rent Act of 1947, ch. 163, tit. 1I, § 209(b),
61 Stat. 201.
44. 42 U.S.C. § 1413a (1964). The similarity in the language of the three provisions, as
well as their common historical and statutory context, requires that they bo construed in
pari materia.
45. Section 209(a) of the Housing and Rent Act, note 42 supra, Vermitted landlords
to evict a tenant who violated statutory obligations of tenancy, committed a nuisance on
the premises, or used accommodations for immoral or illegal purposes. Thus, public
housing authorities needed no special exemption to remove residents who were damaging
the project or endangering and disturbing neighbors. The exemption, therefore, must
have been aimed at excess-income tenants.
Of course, the effect of 209(b) was to excuse public housing authorities from any stric.
tures imposed upon their powers to terminate by Section 209(a). Yet this hardly supports
the inference that Congress intended authorities to be treated like a private landlord-
in fact, it reflects Congressional recognition that public housing authorities are very
different things from ordinary landlords. while Section 209(b) did allow the authorities
to have tenants evicted on grounds not enumerated in Section 209(a), it did not empower
them-expressly or implicitly-to terminate leases for any or no reason.
46. See note 48 infra.
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state housing policies. This interest cannot justify the removal of a
public housing tenant, unless he is able to obtain adequate housing
elsewhere, or unless his conduct becomes dangerous, destructive, or
harmful to others in the project.4 The public landlord, in short, does
not require the broad discretion of a private landlord. Housing au-
thorities who claim such discretion deceive themselves about the nature
of their problems. Courts which accept the validity of these claims
substitute glib analogy for analysis. 48
Some courts, either recognizing the frailty of the landlord analogy
or searching for an even handier hook on which to hang a curt dis-
missal of the tenant's arguments, have invoked the privilege doctrine-
baldly stated, that the government may impose any condition on the
bestowal of its benefits and withdraw them for any or no reasonmA Like
the landlord analogy, the privilege doctrine and its relevance to public
housing has not been examined in the opinions. Most often, the courts
simply assert that since no one has a right to enter public housing,
no one has a right to remain in it.8 °
However sharp the distinction between privilege and right once
was, it has in recent years been much eroded and the privilege doctrine
can now hardly be so casually relied upon. Confronted with concrete
examples of the injury that deprivation of "non-rights" has caused, the
Supreme Court has held that the government is not always free to re-
47. See p. 992 supra.
48. See, e.g., Walton v. City of Phoenix, 69 Ariz. 26, 208 P.2d 309 (1949), in which the
court assumed that the housing authority could not preserve and maintain its property
unless it was as free to act at any other landlord. Id. at 20, 208 P.2d at 312. Since common
law rules, as well as their statutory codifications, reflect the inherent dichotomy of interests
between ordinary landlord and tenant, applying these rules automatically to the public
housing situation, where the dichotomy is missing, extends them beyond the boundaries
of their rationale. Cessante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa lex.
49. The doctrine's most oft-cited articulation is found in some dicta which Justice
Brandeis threw into the Court's opinion in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
without bothering to qualify it for the benefit of a literal-minded posterity:
Pensions, compensation, allowances and privileges are gratuities. They involve no
agreement of parties, and the grant of them creates no vested right. The benefits con-
ferred by gratuities may be redistributed or withdrawn at any time in the discretion
of Congress.
Id. at 577. The doctrine was not applied in Lynch, the Court holding that the benefits
there-War Risk Insurance paynents-were contractual.
For a survey of the privilege doctrine and its gradual, but uneven erosion, see I K. DAvis,
ADMNisATVE LAW §§ 7.11-.12. See also pp. 998-1000 infra.
50. See Municipal Housing Authority v. Walck, 277 App. Div. 791, 97 N1Y.S.2d 488
(1950) (tenants had no right to remain in possession); cf. Chicago Housing Authority v.
Blackman, 4 Ill. 2d 319, 122 N.E.2d 522 (1954). The court in Bacman held that, while
the tenants had no right to stay, the authority had no right to evict them for failing to
sign a loyalty oath which failed to distinguish between knowing and innocent membership
in subversive organizations. 122 N.E.2d at 524. In stating that the tenants lacked any right
to continued occupancy, however, the court at least suggested that their lcas e might be
terminated for many other equally senseless reasons-or-for no stated reason at all.
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yoke benefits. Public employment,5 ' occupational licenses,02 and at
times security clearances53 have thus come within or very near the pale
of rudimentary due process. One federal circuit has added attendance
at a state university to the list,5 4 and state courts have also protected
interests in such benefits as unemployment compensation55 against
termination without hearing or justification. The effect of these deci-
sions is to turn the privilege doctrine on its head: the question Is no
longer whether the tenant has a right to remain, but whether the hous-
ing authority has the power to expel him without cause or fair pro-
ceedings, 6
51. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
62. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 355 U.S. 232 (1957); Konigsberg v. State Bar,
359 US, 252 (1957).
53. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Romer v. Richmond, 292 F.2d 719 (D.C.
Cit. 1901) Parker V. Lester, 227 F.2d 708 (9th Cir. 1955). In all of these cases, security
clearance Was necessary if the claimant was to pursue his chosen vocation withln the
private sector-Greene was an aeronautical engineer, Homer was a radio officer, and
Parker a seaman in the merchant marine. The courts were mtch influenced, in holding
that some procedural safeguards had to be respected before the clearance could be re-
voked, by the fact that the Government's action in effect endangered the appellants'
livelihoods.
54. Dixon Vr. Alabama State 3d. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150 (5th Cir.), ccrt. denied, B6
US. 930 (1961),
55. Syrek v. California Unemployment Ins. App. Bd., 2 Cal. Rptr. 40 (Ct. App.), afJ'd,
54 Cal. 2d 519, 7 Cal. Rptr. 97, 354 P.2d 625 (1960) (adopting opinion below).
56. Thred distinct, though interwoven strands run through these decisions, Each tieg
the requirements of due process-notice, a fair hearing, and a decision based on the hear-
ing and guided by rational rules and principles-to the practical realities of the case.
Rather than resting on easy analogies, the analysis used in these decisions tests the govern-
ment's action by the harm it has caused, the nature of the inhibitions it places on in-
dividual behavior, and the likelihood that the procedures followed have produced
reasdable and fair retlts. The principle that due process standards apply whenever the
goVeriment's actionS threaten substantial harm to private citizens was plainly stated In
Konigsberg V. State Bar, 35f U.S. 252 (1957). California had denied Konigsberg admilssou
to the bar after he refuged to anwer questions about his past political beliefs. The Court
held that mere refusal to answer the questions did riot constitute sufficient evidened of
disloyalty and that the state, by acting on this evidence alone, had deprived Konigsberg
of "the right to practice law" without due process. Id. at 262. justice Black, writing for
the Court, did hot think it necessary to trace the pedigree of this right aty farther than
to the injury denial of admission caused.
The Committe's action prevents tKonigsberg] from earning a living by practicing
law. This deprivation has grave consequenhes for a man who has spent yeats of study
and a great deal of money in preparing to be a lawyer.
Id. at 257-58; accord, Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 US. 96 (1903),
Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
The idea that injury defines interest also explains the tendency of courts to treat bene-
fits as rights when the beneficiary has greatly relied on their receipt, while regarding thent
as mere privileges when little has been staked on obtaining them, Compare Greene v.
McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 496 (1959) with Cafeteria Workers Local 473 V. McElroy, 367 U.S.
886, 895-96 (1961), Both cases involve civilians who lost nongovernmental positions after
ah official revoked th~it security clearance. The best justification for the opposite retultj
teached by the Court lies in the difference between harnt done a short-order cool:, who
lost only the opportunity to Work in one particular place, and that suffered by an acro
nautical engineer, who was effectively barred from pursuing his chosen vocation. See also
ThompsOn v. Gleason, 317 F.2d 901, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1962) (quacre); Dixon v. Alabama State
Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 157 (5th Cir.) cert. denied, 368 U.S. 930 (1961).
Reliance operates here as a convenient measure of the ,1mount of harm necessary to
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A few courts have called arbitrary terminations an exercise of public
housing authorities' administrative discretion and upheld them with-
out mentioning either landlord-tenant law or the privilege doctrine."7
These decisions started from the right premise, and the right labels,
only to reach the wrong conclusion. Public housing authorities are
primarily administrative agencies of the governmentr s but from this
it hardly follows that courts owe unhesitating deference to their judg-
ments. Rather, since their landlord functions are incidental to the
administration of national and state laws, not the converse, courts
should look beyond the terms of "leases" to the statutory standards
raise a privilege to a right. Since the harm suffered by recipients whose benefits have been
terminated usually results from steps they have taken in expectation of continued receipt,
reliance may be a reasonable as well as manageable line of demarcation. Where detri-
mental reliance is present, moreover, courts should pay it heed, because it is frequently
a requisite of obtaining benefits. A family moving into public housing must give up its
old home, leave a familiar neighborhood, and rearrange consumption and living patterns.
If the family is later expelled from the housing project, its members will probably find
that the government's generous hand has only made their situation worse.
Serious economic injury has not been the sole factor identifiable in decisions bringing
benefits within the protection of the due process clause, Cases have also turncd on the
degree of arbitrariness in the injurious action. In Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183
(1952), the Court held that a public school teacher was denied due process when the state
fired him for refusing to take an all-inclusive loyalty oath:
We need not pause to consider whether an abstract right to public employment
exists. It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to the public
servant whose exclusion... is patently arbitrary or discriminatory.
Id. at 192. While Wieman is a precedent of uncertain vitality, state courts have occasionally
upset particularly capricious denial of benefits, invoking either the Wieman principle, as
in Peters v. New York City Housing Authority, 9 Misc. 2d 942, 128 N.Y.S.2d 224 (Sup.
Ct. 1953), rev'd on other grounds, 507 N.Y. 519, 121 N.E, 529 (1954), or one derived from
the concept of equal protection. See Kutchpr v. Housing Authority, 20 N.J, 181, 119 A-2d 1
(1955). In addition, the theory that the government denies equal protection when It
excludes an applicant for irrelevant or discriminatory reasons has gained a foothold in at
least one federal circuit. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964).
Finally, courts have enjoined officials from employing termination to punish activities
enjoying constitutional protection. In the past decade the Supreme Court has gradually
accepted the idea that dispensation of government favors cannot be manipulated to in-
hibit the expression of ideas, Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1948), to penalize an
exercise of the right against self-incrimination, Slochower v. Board of Higher Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956), or to burden unnecessarily the practice of religious faith. Sherbert v.
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). Narrowly taken, the proposition that the government cannot
sanction the exercise of a constitutional right by revoking benefits is only an exception
to the privilege doctrine. But one federal court has already caused the exception to
swallow the rule by holding that "the State cannot condition the granting of even a
privilege upon the renunciation of the constitutional right to procedural due process."
Dixon v. Alabama State Bd, of Educ., supra at 156.
57. Columbus Met. Housing Authority v, Stires, 34 Ohio App. 331, 84 N.E.2d 295
(1949) (court will not inquire into method by which authority makes determination, re-
quired by 42 U.S.C. § 1413a (1964), that the evicted tenant would suffer no hardship);
Smalls v. White Plains Housing Authority, 34 Misc. 2d 949, 230 N.Y,2S.d 106 (Sup. Ct.
1962) (termination power is legislative and administrative in nature).
58. See N.Y. PuB. HousnwG LAW, § 2 (McKinney Supp. 1967). Public housing authorities
are created by statute, funded from public coffers, grantcd exemption from state and
local taxes and appointed by political officials.
See also O'Keefe v. Dunn, 89 N.J. Super. 383, 595, 215 A.2d 66, 73 (1965), aj'd mom.,
47 N.J. 210, 219 A2d 872 (1966), (public housing authority is simultaneously an agency
of municipal, state and federal governments).
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which bind the administrator and to the constitutional standards which
the government must respect whenever and through whomever it acts."0
Since public housing authorities are creatures of legislatures, na-
tional and state, any discretion they have must derive from the statutes
which have created them and endowed them with defined powers.00
The discretion may be granted in express language, or implied by in-
tentional omissions of statutory criteria to govern the authorities in
the use of these powers. However, where precise standards have been
supplied by the legislature, the authority cannot assert a discretion to
ignore them. Moreover, even where standards are lacking, the authority
is not exempt from constitutional prescriptions."'
In fact, public housing officials do have statutory standards which
limit their power to terminate tenant leases. Although these criteria
are largely embedded in expressions of legislative policies and cannot
be readily extracted in crystal-cut form, they have been clearly and re-
peatedly stated in federal and state statutes:
It is hereby declared that.., these [slum] conditions require that
provision be made for the investment of public and private funds
.*. in low rent housing .... the gradual demolition of existing
insanitary and unsafe housing and the construction of new housing
facilities, . . . in accord with proper standards of sanitation and
safety and at a cost which will permit monthly rentals which per-
sons of low income can afford to pay.... 0 2
While the public housing program is an exercise of the federal spend-
ing power and the state police power, and therefore aimed broadly at
the improvement of the public welfare, safety, health and morals,0 3 the
statutes do not purport to accomplish these ends by any means other
59. Rudder v. United States, 226 F.2d 51, 53 (D.C. Cir. 1955):
The government as landlord is still the government. It must not act arbitrarily, for,
unlike private landlords, it is subject to the requirements of due process of law.
Mr. Justice Douglas later quoted this excerpt with evident approval. Thorpe v. Housing
Authority, 386 U.S. 670, 678 (1967) (concurring opinion). The point was also made by a
state court. Housing Authority v. Cordova, 130 Cal. App. 2d 883, 279 P.2d 215 (1955),
cert. denied, 350 U.S. 969 (1956).
60. Some state constitutions authorize the creation of public housing authorities. E.g.,
CAL. CONsr., art. XXXIV, §§ 1-2 (West 1954); N.Y. CONsT., art. 18, § 1. But it is still the
legislature which brings the authorities into existence and determines what powers, they
shall exercise. E.g., CALIF. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 34240, 34310-12 (West 1967); N.Y.
PuB. HousINc LAw, § 30 (McKinney 1955).
61. Even if the public housing laws left the authorities complete discretion to terminate
leases, they could not do so for clearly improper and irrelevant reasons, for this would
abuse their discretion. See Justice Musmanno's dissenting opinion in Blumenschein v,
Pittsburgh Housing Authority, 379 Pa. 566, 579, 102 A.2d 331, 337 (1954); cf. 1 K, DAVIS,
AD,1INsTATiVE LAW § 5.03, at 298 (1958).
62. N.Y. PUB. HousING LAW § 2 (McKinney Supp. 1967). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1401 (1964).
63. See, e.g., statutes cited note 62 supra.
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than providing decent shelter for those who need but cannot afford
it. The results of allowing project officials to turn occupants out at
whim illustrate the dangers of using public housing as an all-purpose,
blunt instrument of social reform. 64 To prevent such misuse and abuse
of the program, housing authorities and courts alike should limit evic-
tion to cases where an actual threat to tie project or those within it
exists, rather than use it broadly against the very problem that public
housing was created to solve, not by denying shelter, but by providing
it.
The problem of assuring effective review of lease terminations falls
into two parts: when the tenant receives a hearing, and what form
that hearing takes. If the privilege doctrine is truly moribund in this
context, the tenant has a constitutional right to a fair hearing before
eviction becomes final.05 Present practice ostensibly meets this mini-
mum requirement: since the tenant can be formally evicted only by
judicial process, he receives-at least in theory-a "full judicial hear-
ing." Yet while such eviction actions might satisfy constitutional pro-
cedural requirements, they have rarely proved the occasion of an
effective review of the housing authority's action. The form of a sum-
mary proceeding has too often misled courts into treating eviction
from public housing as no different from private landlord-tenant dis-
putes. For this reason, judicial review through other routes might be
desirable. Public housing tenants have sometimes sought review by
bringing suits to enjoin the housing authority from seeking eviction 0
or to have terminations declared void. 7 The available opinions sug-
gest that such tactics encourage courts to treat the problem as one of
agency review rather than landlord-tenant relations.08 By seizing the
64. See p. 992 supra. Part of the cost of such a shortsighted policy can be easily
quantified. In 1957, a government study estimated the expense to a housing project
of a turnover-one family moving out and another moving in-to be about $100. PHA,
MOBIY AND MOTWATIONS, supra note 27, at 5. That )'ear over 18,000 familes ivere
removed from public housing as undesirable tenants-costing the prograam over one and
a half million dollars in turnover expenses alone. Id. 15. Given the expansion of public
housing and inflation, the present annual cost of turnovers due to eiction and termination
may be twice that.
65. Nickey v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 393 (1934). See also K. DAvys, A=nxisrmn m LAw
§ 7.10, at 448-49 and n.7 (1958).
66. E.g., Brand v. Chicago Housing Authority, 120 F.2d 786 (7th Cir. 1911); Wolfe v.
United States Housing Authority, 36 F. Supp. 580 (W.D.N.Y. 1940); Kutcher %. Housing
Authority, 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Smalls v. White Plains Housing Autlority, 34
Misc. 2d 949, 230 N.Y.S.2d 106 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
67. E.g., Austin v. New York City Housing Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 206, 267 N.Y.S.2d 309
(Sup. Ct. 1966), Lawson v. Housing Authority, 2-70 Wis. 269, 70 NA..2d G05 (1955).
68. Compare Kutcher v. Housing Authority, 20 N.J. 181, 119 A.2d 1 (1955); Sanders v.
Cruise, 10 Misc. 2d 533, 173 N.Y.S.2d 871 (Sup. Ct. 1958); and Lawson v. Housing Authority,
270 Wis. 269, 70 NA.2d 605 (1955) with Chicago Housing Authority v. Ivory, 341 Ill.
App. 282, 93 N.E.2d 386 (1950) (abstract); Columbus Met. Housing Authority v. Simpson,
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initiative from the authority, the plaintiffs can push the critical issues
to the fore. Most important, bringing an action for injunction or
declaratory judgment against the authority leapfrogs the case over the
sub-baseline courts which handle summary proceedings and into tribu-
nals that are usually of higher caliber and broader vision.02 The litiga-
tion is more costly and complicated than defending an action for
summary proceeding, but it offers the hope of strong precedents to
awaken lower courts.
For the same reasons, review in federal courts is an even more ap-
pealing prospect. Under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA),
anyone "adversely affected" by the actions of a federal agency is en-
titled to review of those actions in court, unless a statute commits the
action to the agency's sole discretion or otherwise precludes judicial
intervention.70 Section I of the APA defines federal agency circularly
to include "each authority of the Government of the United States."7 1
Since federally assisted public housing authorities in effect exercise
the national government's spending power to administer a national
housing program, they might be considered agencies of the United
States despite the contractual form through which federal power flows
into them.7 2 To this extent, the APA may further undermine the con-
clusion that terminations are beyond the scrutiny of the courts. Un-
happily, however, the Act does not confer additional jurisdiction on
federal courts, and federal jurisdiction over public housing cases must
be invoked under some other provision.'M
85 Ohio App. 73, 85 N.E.2d 560 (1949); and Municipal Housing Authority v, Walck, 277
App. Div. 791, 97 N.Y.S2d 488 (1950) (mem.).
69. In New York, an action to have an administrative determination declared void is
brought in the state supreme court special term. N.Y. Civ. PRac. L. & R., § 7804 (McKin,
ney 1963). Summary proceedings, on the other hand, can be maintained in any city, police,
or justice of the peace court. N.Y. R.AL,. PRoP. Actio~s g: PROo~rrNcs LAW § 701 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1967). See also N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:6-34(b) (Supp. 1967) and Wis. STAT. ANN.§§ 269.56 (1957), 299.01(1) (Supp. 196i7).
70. Administrative Procedure Act § 10(a), 5 U.S.C. § 10Q9 (1965).
71. Administrative Procedure Act § 2(a), 5 U.S.C. § 1001 (1965).
72. See note 58 supra; cf. Kam Koon Van v. Black Ltd., 188 F,2d 558 (9th Cir, 1951),
suggesting that whenever the federal government puts its authority and power behind
someone, it has created an agent.
73. See Blackmar v. Guerre, 342 U.S. 512 (1952) (APA authorizes review only in courts
of competent jurisdiction and does not create jurisdiction in federal district courts over
actions brought against officers of federal government); Richfield Oil Corp. v, United
States, 207 F.2d 864 (9th Cir. 1953) (alternative holding).
In Merge v. Sharott, 341 F.2d 989 (3d Cir. 1965), two businessmen, suing for a redoter-
mination of relocation expenses incurred when they were forced to move their plant from
an urban renewal area, were allowed to include the local urban redevelopment authority
as defendant in an action which the court seemed to think was brought under Section 10
of the APA. No one raised the multifold problems of definition and jurisdiction and the
court-majority and dissent alike--let it pass almost unnoticed. The majority thought
that it mattered little whether the local URA was properly a defendant, since they felt
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The most promising source of federal jurisdiction seems to be Sec-
tion 1843 of the Judicial Code, which grants district courts original
jurisdiction over any civil action, regardless of amount, to redress the
deprivation of constitutional rights under color of state law.74 A Fifth
Circuit decision has already held that Section l43 opens the federal
courthouse door to an applicant denied a liquor license by a state
agency without fair procedures or ascertainable standards. " While
federal courts cannot sit as a board of review for every eviction from
public housing without changing radically the relation between state
and federal governments, they can properly intervene to establish
precedents where housing authorities terminate leases for insufficient
cause or improper reasons and where state courts have not afforded
tenants any effective review.70
Despite its attractions as a device to establish precedent, judicial
review de novo-even in state courts--cannot practicably be de-
manded for every lease termination. If decisions to evict are to be re-
viewed effectively, fair hearings administered by the housing authority
are a desirable, perhaps necessary alternative. A housing authority
should be better able to review the factual situation carefully than are
understaffed municipal courts with their overloaded dockets.77 In ad-
the claim was really against the federal agency. Id. at 995. The two dissenting judges
argued that the action could only lay against the URA, but never came near the jurisdic-
tional question because they contended that a previous action in the state court barred
the present litigation in any event. Id. at 998. Perhaps the court already had jurisdiction
under the federal question provision, Section 1331 of the Judicial Code, since the plain.
tiff's claim against the local URA-an agency whose relation to the federal government is
analogous to that of a public housing authority-rested on a provision in the Housing
Act of 1949. In that case, the APA could have applied to the URA only insofar as to make
its determination reviewable by a court. This would accord with the suggestion in the
text that the public housing authority is a federal agency for the purposes of the APA
and also with the view that section 10 of the APA did no more than codify the courts'
common law powers to review administrative determinations. See 3 K. DAvls, AoMwLs A-
= LAw § 23.02, 4 id. § 28.08 (1958). The confused opinion in Merge v. Sharott does not
support this hypothesis-in fact, it does not support any hypothesis-but this seems the
easiest way to explain the result.
74. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1964).
75. Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964). When coupled with 42 U.S.C. § 1933
(1964) which grounds a cause of action against anyone depriving a citizen of the United
States, or a person within its jurisdiction, of any right, privilege, or immunity secured by
the federal Constitution and laws. See also Bares v. Merritt, 376 F.2d 8 (5th Cir. 1957).
76. Cf. Horusby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1964) (federal court cannot deter-
mine whether plaintiff was entitled to a state liquor license, but it can decide whether
state agency's procedures denied due process and equal protection).
Of course, if state courts are willing to give conscientious review, there is no depriva-
tion of constitutional rights to bring Section 1343 into operation, and, consequently, no
federal jurisdiction. Moreover, where defects in the housing authority's procedures offen-
sive to due process can be safely left to the state judiciary to repair, federal courts should
abstain from the fray. 3 K. DAvis, ADSiiNwt5raTivE LAw §§ 23.18, 23.20 (1958), describing
federal courts' equitable discretion to abstain from reviewing actions of state agencies.
77. Professor Davis points out that one of the difficulties with judicial review; de nolo
is that courts may not have the resources to conduct a good one very often. 1 K. DAvis,
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dition to sheer efficiency, other considerations argue for review closer
to the original decision. The availability of a remedy within the walls
of the project might reduce the tenants' mistrust of management. And,
since reversal of their decisions would come at the hands of direct su-
periors, administrative review might serve as a stronger deterrent to
overzealous project managers.
78
If housing authorities fail to initiate review themselves, the decision
for administrative review must be made at other levels. Under the
Housing Act of 1937 and its many amendments, HUD has ample au-
thority to establish a review process within federally assisted housing
authorities. Section 15(4) of the Act empowers HUD to insert in the
annual subsidy contracts with local authorities "such other covenants,
conditions, or provisions as it may deem necessary in order to insure
the low-rent character of the housing project involved... .,,7 The terms
of their contracts further bind the local authorities to respect periodic
instructions from HUD, such as those found in the Management Man-
ual and in circular directives.80 To date, however, HUD's use of its
power to impose fair procedures upon the authorities has been all too
sparing."' Like the housing authorities themselves, the federal depart-
ment seems to await a signal from the courts that reform is in order.
If the decision for administrative review is made, at whatever level,
courts must still give careful attention to the form of review pro-
vided 12 At least four conditions should be met if the hearing is to be
"fair and impartial." First, the tenant must have reasonably detailed
notice of the grounds for his eviction prior to the hearing.8 3 Second,
he should be confronted with the evidence and witnesses against him
and allowed to explain or challenge it.84 Third, while the appoint-
ADMVINITRATIVE LAW § 7.10, at 451. Thus public housing tenants might end up with a
hasty look-see only a little better than the shrug they now get.
78. This is not to say that courts should never review lease terminations de novo.
Judicial efforts to lead a reluctant authority to a procedure in accord with due procesg
through a series of remands and instructions could take some time. Where public housing
officials appear to be deliberately dragging their feet, review de novo should be given to
spare the tenant and his family prolonged uncertainty and additional litigation. Taking
the matter completely out of the authority's hands might also prompt it to speedier
reform.
79. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(4) (1964). Section 1415 further provides that the Secretary may
increase the interest rate on federal loans to the local authority, demand immediate pay-
ment of the unpaid principle of these loans, and cease annual subsidies where a "substan-
tial" breach of the covenants in the contract has occurred. 42 U.S.C. § 1415(l)-(3) (1961).
80. See HOUSING AssisTANcE ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF -lOUsING AND URBAN Di:-
VELOPMENT, LOW-RENT MANAGE?EMNT MANUAL, § 0 (preface) (May 1966).
81. Note 35 supra.
82. See Hornsby v. Allen, 326 F.2d 605 (5th Cir. 1964); Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of
Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 158-59 (5th Cir. 1961); 1 K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 7.02 (1958).
83. Willner v. Committee on Character & Fitness, 373 U.S. 96 (1963).
84. Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959). The decision did not require actual con-
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ment of legally qualified counsel is probably impractical, the tenant
should be allowed to retain counsel or, if he cannot obtain one, be
permitted to bring to the hearing an advisor who understands such
quasi-legal rites.85 Fourth, there should be some separation of the ad-
judicatory and prosecutorial roles; the official urging eviction should
not sit to judge its propriety as well.80
If these conditions are met and the tenant has been accorded an
adequate opportunity to be heard before the housing authority, a
court reviewing the decision, whether in an eviction proceeding or in
a suit brought by the tenant need not recover the ground with the
same thoroughness.87 In accordance with the standards conventionally
applied in judicial review of administrative action, the court need
only determine whether the authority's decision is supported by sub-
stantial evidence and whether the regulations applied by the authority
are consistent with the policies underlying public housing and any
statutory standards specifically set for the authority85 Of course,
frontation with informants, but this probably reflects judicial caution in the extra-sensitive
area of national security and foreign espionage. See, e.g., Homer v. Richmond, 292 F."d
719, 724 (D.C. Cir. 1961). In Dixon v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 294 F.2d 150, 159 (5th
Cir. 1961), the court suggested that confrontation was highly desirable in a hearing that
might lead to expulsion from a state university, though it did not think due process re-
quired one at all times.
85. Public housing tenants are of a class often unfamiliar with their rights and un-
skilled in asserting them; unless they have some assistance, all the other safeguards will
probably degenerate into mere form. Calm & Cahn, The War on Poverty, 73 YALE 1J.
1317, 1334-52 (1964). See also Reich, Individual Rights and Social Wielfare: Tie Emerging
Legal Issues, 74 YALE L.J. 1245, 1252-53 (1965); Note, The Indigent's Right to Counsel in
Civil Cases, 76 YAx L.J. 545 (1967).
86. Even layman's psychology would conclude that the member of the project staff
who initiated the termination proceeding, gathered the evidence against the tenant, and
urged removal could hardly give fair weight to the tenant's arguments or fail to favor
termination if he were permitted to sit on the reviewing panel. This observation is
plainly reflected in Section 5 of the APA. 5 US.C. § 1004 (1954).
Cf. In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133 (1955), which reversed a conviction of criminal con-
tempt where the allegedly offending conduct had taken place in the sole presence of the
judge who adjudged it contemptuous:
Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. But our
system of law has always endeavored to prevent even the probability of unfairness.
Id. at 136. The standard in non-criminal proceedings presumably would be less strict.
But where strong bias is almost unavoidable, even a casual standard of fairness requires
some corrective.
87. Due process does not demand two complete hearings. See Jordan v. United Ins. Co.
of Am., 289 F.2d 778, 783 (D.C. Cir. 1961); cf. First Natl Bank v. Saxon, 352 F.2d 267 (4th
Cir. 1965).
88. A few courts have recognized the duty to measure project regulations against the
purposes of the program and strike those found dearly wanting. In Lawson N. Housing
Authority, 270 Wis. 269, 70 N.V.2d 605 (1955), the Wisconsin Supreme Court found that
a regulation requiring all of the tenants to sign loyalty oaths bore no relation to the needs
of the housing program and duly voided it:
Counsel for the defendant Authority have failed to point out to this court how the
occupation of any units of a federally aided housing project by tenants who may be
member of a subversive organization threatens the successful operation of such housing
projects.
Id. at 287, 70 NAV.2d at 615. A New York court quashed a termination notice because
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courts may slide along in their accustomed rut and simply rubber-
stamp the decision to terminate. Indeed, the presence of a hearing be.
low might render courts legs eager than they have been to review the
reasonableness of the decision to terminate a tenant's lease.80 But this
should not be the case. The existence of a hearing below ought to
alert courts to the fact that they are reviewing not the decision of a
private landlord entitled to pursue his private interests, but the action
of a governmental agency entrusted with implementation of impor-
tant national policy.
"to evict tenants from a public housing project on the sole ground that their adult son
is a drug addict exceeds any reasonable requirement for the peaceful occupancy of the
project and for the preservation of property.' Sanders v. Cruise, 10 Misc. 2d 533, 597, 173
N.Y.S.2d 871, 875 (Sup. Ct. 1958). Over the years, however, such flashes of reason on the
question have been erratic and brief.
For a brief digest of judidal holdings that agencies cannot go beyond the politleg pat
to them by Congress, see L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINIsTRATIvE AcrioN 267-68
(1566).
89. E.g., Austin v. New York City Housing Authority, 49 Misc. 2d 206, 267 N.Y.S,2d
309 (Sup. Ct. 1966), where the court gave no reasoning other than the fact that the
authority had given the tenant a hearing below to explain a conclusion that the authorlty's
actions were not arbitrary.
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